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Abstract. The paper argues that policymakers bail out banks with nancial problems
to avoid the costs of nancial repression. After nancial liberalization and when risk is
veriable, in some circumstances policymakers can commit to policies that discipline
banks ex-ante and ex-post, by providing bailout to conservative banks and threatening
the takeover of risky banks. When these policies are time consistent, regulatory policies
to deal with moral hazard ex-ante, like for example prudential regulation, become
redundant and policymakers refrain from implementing them.
JEL Classication: G01, G21, G28.
1. introduction
Although attention today is naturally concentrated on the present crisis, signicant
banking crises have occurred in the past both in developing and developed countries.
These crises have been regularly preceded by a process of liberalization of the nancial
system without adequate eorts to improve regulation and supervision. If banks suer
a shock that renders them insolvent, governments tend to bail them out,1 which implies
high costs for the taxpayers and serious problems of moral hazard.
This paper tries to answer the questions raised by these empirical regularities. Why
do governments liberalize the banking sector without an adequate regulation and super-
vision in the rst place? Why do governments bailout banks despite the negative moral
hazard eects and the scal costs involved in such operations?
The main point made in the paper is that when banking crises are preceded by nan-
cial liberalization there is a bias to bailout banks and underinvest in bank supervision.
Policymakers prefer bailouts because they want to avoid reintroducing nancial repres-
sion, i.e. control and/or ownership of private banks by the state sector or a signicant
degree of regulation of the banking sector.
Some hold that it is justiable to bailout banks when there are asymmetries of in-
formation between bankers and regulators regarding the quality of the banks' assets
(Aghion et al. 1999; Gorton and Huang 2002; Mitchell 1998 and Osano 2002). Regu-
lators nd it dicult to commit themselves to takeover banks because, as a response,
bankers could hide their nancial problems and misallocate credit. Therefore, a bailout
* E-mail: jhurtubia@yahoo.it and claudio.sardoni@uniroma1.it. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the `Alumni Workshop 2009' of the Doctoral School of Economics of Sapienza University
of Rome (June 25, 2009). We would like to thank the participants in the workshop and, in particular,
the discussant Giuseppe Ciccarone for their helpful comments.
1For a cross-section analysis of several banking crises in developed and developing economies see
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Reinhart and Rogo (2009)
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may be a second best alternative as it induces bankers to reveal their nancial problems
and correct their credit allocation.2
In our opinion, this line of research leaves some questions unanswered. If asymme-
tries of information justies bailouts, why are regulators not motivated to improve bank
supervision and try to eliminate such asymmetries when the banking system is liberal-
ized? Would the prospect of saving public funds not be a sucient incentive to invest to
improve bank supervision? To answer these questions, we develop a model of strategic
interaction between bankers and regulators. The model explicitly considers the decision
to liberalize banking activities. More precisely the model considers two cases of liber-
alization. As a benchmark case liberalization consists in bank privatization, and as an
extension it consists in bank deregulation.3
At the beginning of the game, the regulator decides whether to privatize the bank and
whether to improve the quality of bank supervision; the banker decides whether to buy
the bank. We assume that the investment in bank supervision aects the probability
to detect the true net value of the bank, but it has no eect on the regulator's ability
to observe or control the banker's investment choices. The bank operates with a full
deposit guarantee and must make two consecutive investment choices in t = 1 and in
t = 2.
Bank privatization is depicted in the model as the transition from nancial repression
to a situation in which the constraints to the bank's investment possibilities are lifted.
With nancial repression, the bank can make only safe investments and there are no
informational asymmetries between regulator and banker. There is, however, a problem
of ineciency represented by a low expected return to the bank's investments.
When the bank privatization takes place the expected return of the safe investment in-
creases. Privatization also allows the bank to make risky investments. Such investments
are characterized by higher volatility of returns; moreover they give rise to informational
asymmetries between regulator and banker.
The privatization of the bank creates a regulatory problem because the banker can
now make a risky investment. The model shows that when the bank's net value is (al-
most) depleted by a bad outcome of the rst investment, the banker prefers to make
a second risky investment because the possible bad outcome of the second investment
can be transferred to the regulator since the deposits are fully guaranteed. This strat-
egy is denominated `betting the bank for survival' (Osano 2002 and Gorton and Huang
2It has also been argued that bailouts can be designed in such a way to avoid ex-ante moral hazard.
Bailout designs are generally analyzed under the hypothesis of non-veriable risk. For example, Cordella
and Yeyati (1999) show that, under non-veriability, a credible commitment to bailout banks as a
reaction to `bad' aggregate shocks eliminates bankers' ex-ante moral hazard. Aghion et al. (1999) show
that non-veriability may create a problem of overcapitalization, which can be corrected if bailouts are
designed to be conditional on the previous liquidation of the banks' bad assets and the transfer scheme is
non-linear. Gorton and Huang (2002) argue that bailouts are welfare increasing because they eliminate
the costs of hoarding the liquidity necessary to make operative a market for the banks' non-performing
assets.
3In many developed countries liberalization has taken such forms as the possibility for banks to operate
in (riskier) sectors previously forbidden to them or the possibility to operate as banks for dierent
nancial institutions. In other cases, especially in less developed countries or transition economies,
liberalization took the more specic form of privatization: banks, previously owned or controlled by the
public sector, are sold to private bankers. See section 5, for some more details on this aspect.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 3
2002). As a response to this strategy, the regulator can either bailout or takeover the
bank. By aecting the payo associated to the takeover, the investment in bank super-
vision inuences the decision on how to tackle bad returns ex-post. The model assumes
risk-veriability therefore the regulator can design risk-contingent policies, i.e. policies
dependent on the banker's choice.
The model shows that nancial liberalization creates a bias in favor of bailouts. When
nancial liberalization takes place, policies that include bailouts to benet conservative
bankers are always possible, independently of the cost to improve (`upgrading') bank
supervision. However, the improvement of bank supervision, which improves the ability
to detect bad returns, does not guarantee that a takeover will always take place because of
the cost of nancial repression associated to it. Bailouts are chosen when the deadweight
cost of capitalizing the bank is lower than the reduction in the economic surplus (of the
bank and debtors) associated to the takeover of the bank.
The banker's ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard can be eliminated when the risk-
contingent policies, which punish a risky behavior with takeover and benet a conser-
vative behavior with bailout, are time consistent. These policies can be implemented
with or without investment in bank supervision. An investment in supervision is made
only if the increase in the probability of detection compensates for the cost of nancial
repression, and allows the regulator to credibly threat the risky banker with a takeover
in case of a bad return.
The eciency properties of policies that benet the conservative banker and punish
the risky banker make cooperative equilibria possible in the case of bank privatization.
The regulator refrains from investing in bank supervision in exchange for a higher bid
price for the bank. When the regulator decides not to invest in supervision, the banker
benets from a bailout, instead of being punished by a takeover. The regulator, on the
other hand, benets from the banker being willing to share with him/her the higher
surplus.
The time consistency feature of policies that benet conservative bankers and punish
risky bankers has also an impact on the regulator's willingness to introduce ex-ante
regulatory measures to deal with the problem of moral hazard. We show that the
regulator does not introduce bank prudential regulations to control the banker's ex-ante
moral hazard, when the time consistent risk-contingent policy already disciplines the
bank ex-ante (and possibly ex-post).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model's assumptions on the
returns to investment are presented together with the denition of the policies that the
regulator can implement. Also the objective functions of the banker and the regulator
are specied. Finally, the timing of the game played by the two agents is synthetically
outlined. Section 3 is devoted to dene and analyze the strategy of `betting the bank for
survival', i.e. the banker's choice to always make a risky investment after experiencing
a bad outcome in the previous period. Section 4 deals with the regulator's responses,
which are contingent on the banker's actions in t = 1 and t = 2. Section 5 looks at
the conditions under which nancial liberalization takes place in t = 0. In section 5 the
cooperative equilibria are characterized, and the extensions to the model are presented.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs of propositions and results of the model are in the
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2. the model and the timing of the game
The model considers the strategic interaction of two agents, a banker and a regulator,
over four periods (t = 0, 1, 2, 3). The banker is risk-neutral and the free-risk interest
rate is normalized to zero for simplicity. The banking system consists of only one bank,
which has to make two consecutive investment decisions in two periods (t = 1, t = 2).4
Financial liberalization
In t = 0, nancial liberalization takes place: the regulator decides to privatize the bank
and the banker must decide whether to bid for it. If the banker decides to bid, he/she
makes a `take it or leave it' oer.5 The regulator must then decide whether to accept the
bid and, simultaneously, whether to invest in supervision. The cost of this investment is
assumed to be g > 0.
Investment returns
The bank, in periods t = 1 and t = 2, underwrites a contract with depositors of a xed
value D, paying a zero interest rate. The bank cannot issue equity capital in any period
of the game. In t = 1, the bank makes a long term investment that matures in the last
period t = 3. The bank chooses between a safe and a risky loan portfolio.
At the beginning of t = 2 an `interim' return R1 to investment in t = 1 materializes.
R1 is a random variable with the following characteristics.
R1 =

A   C1 + r1 if the owner chooses the risky investment in t = 1
A   C1 + s1 if the owner chooses the safe investment in t = 1
It is A > D and r1 and s1 are discrete random variables denoting the `marginal' returns
to the investment. C1 represents the cost of nancial repression in period t = 1. When
the bank is privatized and controlled by the private banker C1 = 0; when the bank is
controlled by the regulator C1 = c > 0.6
Both `marginal returns' r1 and s1 can take only two possible values, a good and a
bad one. r1 can take the values RG or RB and s1 the values SG or SB. It is assumed
that RG > RB and SG > SB.7 The probabilities of the good and bad outcomes are
assumed to be the same for both the risky and safe investment. The probability of the
good outcome is , while the probability of the bad outcome is (1   ); additionally, we
assume that  > (1   ).
The cost of nancial repression c derives from the regulator's inferior skill to screen
investment projects. It is assumed that c cannot go above a threshold dened by,
(2.1) c  A   D + SB + SG
In t = 2, after the rst outcome, the bank owner has the possibility to make again
the same type of investment or to shift to the other type. At the beginning of t = 3 the
4Depositors and bankers are asummed to consume only in t = 3.
5It is assumed that the banker purchases the bank with a xed initial endowment of nancial capital;
the possibility to purchase the bank by using debt is excluded.
6The regulator is in control either when the bank is publicly owned or when the private bank is
managed by the public sector.
7The subscript G denotes a good outcome and the subscript B a bad outcome.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 5
asset portfolio matures and provides the bank owner with the nal return, R2.
R2 =

R1   C2 + r2 if the owner chooses the risky investment in t = 2
R1   C2 + s2 if the owner chooses the safe investment in t = 2
The nal return to the bank's asset portfolio, R2, is equal to the interim value of the
bank's assets, R1, minus the potential cost of nancial repression, C2, plus the `marginal'
returns r2 and s2, which are discrete random variables identically distributed as r1 and
s1 respectively.8
It is assumed that the `marginal' returns to the safe investment have higher means
than those associated to the risky investment, but lower variance. In particular, the
expected `marginal' return to the safe investment is zero:
(2.2) E(si) = SG + (1   )SB = 0 (i = 1;2)
Instead, the expected `marginal' return to the risky investment is negative:
(2.3) E(ri) = RG + (1   )RB < 0
2.2 and 2.3 imply that the expected return to the risky investment is smaller than that
to the safe investment. This poses the question of why a risk-neutral banker should ever
choose the risky investment. The following assumption makes the risky investment a
viable choice:
(2.4) RG > SG
that is to say that the risky investment's good return is larger than the safe investment's
good return9.
However, the choice of the risky investment requires, that there exists some mechanism
thanks to which the bank owner can translate the risky investment's bad returns to
third parties and, instead, enjoy the good returns of the investment. In the model, such
mechanism is the fact that deposits with the bank are fully guaranteed.
10
Asymmetries of information.
When the bank is in the hands of the private banker there arise informational asym-
metries between the banker and the regulator. We distinguish between two types of
asymmetries:
(1) the regulator cannot observe the banker's investment choices (risky or safe) in
any period;
(2) the regulator cannot observe with precision the bank's net value E2(R2   D) in
period t = 2, when the interim return of the bank's investment is revealed to the
banker.
In period t = 2 the regulator may detect the bank's net value either through audits or
by oering a bailout. With audits the probability of detection is , which depends on the
regulator's investment in bank supervision in t = 0. With investment, the probability
of detection is perfect and equal to one,  = 1; without investment, it is 0  0 < 1.
8The random variables r1, s1, r2 and s2 are independently distributed and their covariances are always
zero.
9Equations 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 guarantee that the variance of the returns of the risky investment is
higher than the variance of returns of the safe investment, i.e. RG   RB > SG   SB
10We shall return to this issue in the next section.6 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
The investment in supervision can eliminate only the second type of asymmetry, but it
has no eect on the ability to observe the banker's investment choices. Consequently,
investment in supervision has an impact on how to deal with bad returns ex-post, but
cannot allow the regulator to observe and control the banker's behavior ex-ante.11 With
bailouts the regulator can observe the bank's true net value.
Financial safety net
When the bank remains under public ownership the nancial safety net consists only of
a public deposit guarantee to reimburse deposits at par value in t = 3 (when the bank
closes). If the bank is privatized in t = 0, the full deposit guarantee stays in place, but
the regulator introduces a risk-contingent policy to deal ex-post with the potential bad
outcome of the bank's rst investment. At the beginning of t = 2 the regulator announces
a risk-contingent policy, which is expressed as a function that associates every possible
banker's investment behavior in t = 1 to an action of the regulator to tackle the potential
bad outcome. The risk-contingent policy is dened below.
Denition 1 (Risk-contingent policy). The regulator's risk contingent policy is dened
as a pair of actions faR;aSg, one for each banker's investment choice in t = 1.12 The
actions a are of three possible kinds: forbearance (F), takeover (T) and bailout (B).
The regulator can play this policy even though it doesn't observe the banker's actions
because it is able to infer them ex-post when detecting the bank's true net value in t = 2.
With forbearance, the regulator does nothing. When the bank experiences a bad
outcome, the regulator allows the banker to retain the ownership and control of the
bank and simultaneously denies any capitalization of the bank.
With takeover, the regulator takes control of the bank's management. If, for any
possible investment choice in t = 2, the bank has a negative net value, E2(R2  D) < 0,
it is either closed or nationalized. The banker bears expected private costs equal to   0
(legal prosecution). It is assumed that, if the bank is closed in t = 2, the liquidation
price of its assets is zero. If the regulator discovers that the bank experienced a bad
return but its net value would be still positive if the banker chooses the safe investment
in t = 2, the regulator can assume only the management of the bank to make it sure
that the safe investment is chosen. The banker retains the ownership of the bank.
With the bailout the banker retains the control of the bank and is oered a capitaliza-
tion A. When the banker accepts the bailout, the regulator observes the bank's true
net value. It is assumed that the regulator can only announce capitalization oers to
which he/she can credibly commit after observing the bank's true net value. Bailouts
do not give the regulator either a stake in the bank's ownership or any inuence on the
bank's decision making. The capitalization oers cannot include gifts, which means that
the injection of resources cannot be larger than the bad shock. This is formalized as
follows.
(2.5) 0 < AS   SB
(2.6) 0 < AR   RB
11In section 5 it will be assumed that the regulator can invest in ex-ante bank regulation in order to
observe and control the banker's investment choices in t = 1.
12The subscripts R and S represent the banker's choice of the risky and safe investment respectively.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 7
From 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 it follows that RB and SB are negative. The subscripts R and S
indicate that the constraints on the capitalization oers depend on the type of investment
played by the banker in t = 1.
The bailout takes place in t = 2; it takes the form of a non-tradable public bond (with
maturity at t = 3) transferred to the bank. In t = 3 the bank asset portfolio matures
(loans and the public bond in case of bailout). With the proceeds of the loan portfolio,
depositors are compensated for their investment. If the proceeds are insucient to repay
the deposits, the regulator covers the dierence (full deposit guarantee).13
Objective Functions
The regulator seeks to maximize the expected value of an objective function 
. 

is increasing in the value of the bank's assets in t = 3 (excluding the public bond),
represented by R2, and it is decreasing in the amount of public funds used to deal with
the bank's insolvency:

 = R2 + F
with  < 0 that denotes the ratio of the deadweight cost14 of using one dollar of public
funds to the value generated by one dollar of loans.15 The parameter F includes the
public funds used for the capitalization of the bank, the payment of the guarantee on
deposits, and the cost of the investment to improve bank supervision, net of the proceeds
from the bank's privatization and the net value (if positive) of the nationalized bank.
The banker's objective is to maximize the expected value of the investment in the
bank, , minus the price P paid for it, E(   P). The value of the investment is
 = lnac + (1   lnac)[Max(0;R2 + lBA   D)]
lnac and lB are functions that take the value of 1 when the bank is nationalized or bailed
out and zero otherwise.
Consistency condition
After privatization, the value of the bank at the beginning of t = 1 (before the banker's
rst investment) must be positive:
(2.7) E1(R2   D) > 0:
The term E1(R2) is the expected value in t = 1 of the bank's assets excluding the public
bond that would be transferred to the bank with a bailout policy. If condition 2.7 is not
fullled, the bank is technically insolvent even before making any investment choice, and
the regulator would be induced to take over the bank in t = 1. But the regulator may
have the incentive to takeover the bank even if condition 2.7 is satised. This would be
the case when the regulator presumes that the banker is playing risky in t = 1.16
13This ensures that the depositors are willing to renew their deposits in t = 1 and t = 2.
14The deadweight cost derives from the distorting eects of raising taxes and increasing scal decits.
15
 is a reduced form. The extended form of the objective function is ! = (R2   D) + R2 + F,
where (R2  D) is the net value of the bank, while R2 is the economic surplus generated by the bank's
debtors (assumed to be a proportion  of the bank's loans). The term  stands for the deadweight costs
of a dollar of scal funds. Dividing by (1 + ) we have that
!
(1+) = R2  
D





(1+) yields the same results than maximizing 
; in fact,
D
(1+) is xed and independent of
the adopted policy.
16Such presumption is possible because the objective functions and investment returns are common
knowledge.8 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
The model is rst solved by assuming that there is no ex-ante intervention.17 In the
extensions (section 5), this assumption is removed and the model is solved for the case
in which ex-ante interventions are possible.
Timing of events
The complete game takes place over four periods, but it reduces to a three stage game.
The rst stage consists in a simultaneous-move game where it is decided whether privati-
zation takes place and whether the regulator invests in bank supervision. If privatization
does not take place the regulator makes the two investment decisions before the bank is
closed and the game ends. If the bank is privatized, in the second stage the regulator
and the private banker engage in another simultaneous-move game: the banker decides
the rst investment and the regulator announces a risk-contingent policy to tackle the
possible bad outcomes of the bank's investment. In the last stage of the game, the
banker (or the regulator if in control of the bank) makes the second investment choice.
A summary of the structure of the game and timing of events is presented in table 1.
Table 1. Timing of events
t = 0
The regulator oers the bank for privatization
The banker bids for the bank
The regulator decides whether to accept the bid or not
The regulator decides whether to invest in bank supervision
t = 1
First investment decision of the bank
t = 2
The outcome of the rst investment is revealed to the bank owner
The regulator announces a risk-contingent policy (if the bank was privatized)
Audit of the bank (if the bank was privatized)
Bailout, forbearance, or takeover when a bad outcome is detected
Second investment decision of the bank
t = 3
Outcome of the second investment revealed to the bank owner
The public bond matures
The bank is closed
The regulator pays the guarantee on deposits (if required)
3. betting the bank for survival
The rationale of the regulator's intervention is to stop the banker's strategy of `betting
the bank for survival' (BBFS) in the last stage of the game. This strategy is dened as
follows.
17It is assumed that there are institutions that stop the regulator from taking over the bank in t = 1
if the audit cannot prove that the banker is playing risky, which is always the case because by denition
the banker's actions are not observable.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 9
Denition 2 (Betting the bank for survival). Betting the bank for survival (BBFS) is a
strategy according to which, in t = 2, the banker always makes a risky investment after
a bad return to the rst investment in t = 1. Instead, the banker always makes a safe
investment after a good return to the investment in t = 1.
When the banker plays BBFS, the regulator is induced to intervene because risky
investments are socially inecient, as their expected returns are inferior to the returns
that can be obtained when playing safe (equations 2.2 and 2.3).
The intuition that explains the banker's willingness to play BBFS is that with a low
(or zero) net value of the bank, due to the rst bad return, the regulator bears the losses
from a subsequent bad outcome because of the commitment to fully guarantee deposits.
In other words, the full guarantee of deposits eliminates the depositors' incentive to
discipline the banker by demanding risk premia. As bad returns are transferred to the
regulator, the decision about which investment to make, risky or safe, depends exclusively
on the magnitude of the good returns. As the good returns of the risky investment are
assumed to be higher, the banker will always choose the risky investment.
BBFS, however, requires some additional conditions in order to be chosen by the
banker.18 First, the bad outcome in the rst period must reduce the bank's net value
to such an extent that a subsequent bad return must be mainly borne by the regulator.
Second, after a bad return, a subsequent good return must allow the bank to recover
and realize a positive net value. All this is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given the set of possible results fRG;RB;SG;SB;A;Dg, the following
conditions are sucient to ensure that the banker would adopt the strategy BBFS if the
regulator does not intervene (forbearance).
(1) In t = 2, the bank becomes insolvent, E2(R2  D) < 0, only after a bad return of
the risky investment.
(2) In t = 3, the bank is insolvent, R2 D < 0, only after two consecutive bad returns
regardless of the type of investment chosen.
Proof. See Appendix
Conditions 1 and 2 of proposition 1 ensure that a bad return, regardless of the type of
investment made in the rst period, reduces the bank's net value to such an extent that
the next bad return must be partially or totally absorbed by the regulator. Condition
2 also ensures that a good return to the second investment provides the banker with a
positive net value at the end of t = 3.
In these conditions, the banker has the incentive to make a risky investment in t = 2
after a bad return to the rst investment. In fact, the banker would bear limited costs
from an additional bad return but would enjoy entirely the benets of a good return.
When it is known that the banker will play BBFS, the regulator can intervene in two
ways: takeover or bailout. A takeover prevents the bank from making a second risky
investment because the investment (or the closing down of the bank) is now decided
18Obviously, the bank must be privately owned. Only in this case can the banker transfer bad
returns to the regulator. A public bank would never choose the risky investment because the regulator
internalizes the ineciencies of this type of investment.10 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
by the regulator. A bailout disciplines the banker by increasing the bank's net value;
therefore the ineciency of the risky investment is internalized by the bank.
The eectiveness of the takeover depends on the probability of detection . In fact,
the regulator can take the bank over only if an audit detects the bad outcome of the
investment. The eectiveness of the bailout depends on the size of the capitalization
oer, which can aect the banker's behavior only if it is above a certain threshold. All
this is formalized in proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. The regulator's intervention in t = 2 prevents the banker from playing
BBFS in the following two cases:
(1) If the audit detects, with probability , a bad outcome of the investment in t = 1
(takeover).
(2) If the capitalization oer to the banker is suciently high (bailout). More pre-
cisely, it must be:
(a) AS   SB + 
1 RG   (A   D) when the banker has played safe in t = 1.
(b) AR   RB + 
1 RG  (A D) when the banker has played risky in t = 1.
Proof. See Appendix
The bailout policy that disciplines the banker is feasible only if the capitalization oer




RG < A   D
4. bailouts and the ex-ante and ex-post discipline of the banker
In t = 1, the banker makes the rst investment choice and, simultaneously, the reg-
ulator announces the risk-contingent policy.19 The regulator can announce only time-
consistent policies because he/she cannot pre-commit. Therefore the regulator's selected
risk-contingent policy must consist of a pair of best responses to every banker's choice
in t = 1. As a consequence, the regulator implements a strictly dominant policy, and
the banker reacts to it.
The intervention of the regulator and the convenience to bailout are justied when
the banker plays the BBFS strategy in t = 2 and when the disciplining capitalization
specied in proposition 2 is feasible.20 The game is solved only for a feasible set as
dened below.
Denition 3 (feasible set). The feasible set 	 contains all the elements  =fRG, RB,
SG, SB, A , D, g that comply with proposition 1 and equation 3.1.
19The game is depicted in this way even though chronologically the banker's decision is made before
the regulator's announcement. The rationale for considering the two decisions as simultaneous is the
existence of informational asymmetries that force the regulator to make his/her choice without knowing
the banker's previous move.
20The regulator can only commit to bailout with capitalizations that are equal to the minimum
required to prevent the banker from playing BBFS, AS =  SB +

1 RG   (A   D) and AR =
 RB +

1 RG   (A   D). A larger capitalization would be redundant; while a bailout with a lower
capitalization is always strictly dominated by forbearance, which is equivalent to a bailout with a zero
capitalization oer.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 11
The nationalization of the bank always dominates its closure when the regulator takes
over the bank and detects a bad return to a risky investment. This follows from the
assumption of a zero liquidation price of the assets in t = 2, and the commitment to
guarantee deposits.21
The regulator's best response to the banker's investment choice in t = 1 requires
balancing the costs of BBFS, nancial repression and scal funds to capitalize the bank.
With forbearance, BBFS takes place and reduces the economic value of the bank's
assets; consequently, there arise positive expected deadweight costs for the payment
of the deposit guarantee. Takeover reduces the probability of BBFS (in proportion to
the probability  of detecting bad returns) but implies the costs associated to nancial
repression. Bailout eliminates BBFS and the expected payment of the deposit guarantee,
but it increases the deadweight costs of the public funds allocated to the capitalization
of the bank.
The best response to the banker's investment in t = 1, therefore, depends on f , c,
, g. Any option (forbearance, bailout or takeover) can be the best response. If any
policy can be the best response, it must be true that there exists a set f , c, , g that
supports strictly dominant risk-contingent policies that include bailout.
Proposition 3 shows that, when risk is veriable, the regulator can implement policies
that discipline the banker ex-ante and ex-post. Such policies are characterized by bailouts
to the benet of the conservative banker. The proposition also shows that even when
the regulator cannot pre-commit to any policy, there still exists a subset of f , c, , g
for which the regulator can announce these policies.
Proposition 3. When there is a pure strategy equilibrium the following holds:
(1) The regulator implements a strictly dominant policy a = faR;aSg, which depends
on f ;c;;g. ai, (i = R;S) is the best response function.22
(2) When   2 	 there exist sets f , c, , g that support risk-contingent policies that
discipline the banker in t = 1 and t = 2. These policies imply a bailout in favor
of the conservative banker when a bad return occurs: fTR;BSg and fFR;BSg.
Proof. See Appendix
The set of all possible f , c, , g can be partitioned in three subsets, each associated
to a dierent best response to the banker's investment in t = 1 (either safe or risky).
Figure 1 represents, in the space(c;), the locus that separates the set into these three
21If we assume that the regulator can refuse to guarantee the deposits, then, even if the liquidation
price of the assets is zero, it may be advantageous to close the bank if  is suciently large, so that
the benets of not paying the deposit guarantee outweigh the costs of the asset liquidation. In order
that the nationalization is dominant, it must be E2(
nationalization) > E2(
closure), which amounts to
A + RB   c + (D   A   RB + c) > 0. Solving for , we obtain  >  
1
D
A+RB c  1 The right hand side
of this inequality is negative and decreases with the leverage of the bank, for any given A   D. Thus,
for this constraint on  not to be binding, it is sucient to assume large values of A and D for a given
(A   D).
22Each a depends on  ;c;;; with   2 	.12 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
subsets.23 Each area is the image in the (c;) space of the intersection of sets in which a
policy dominates the other two. The separating locus itself is formed by the indierence
curves between pairs of policies, in which the third policy is strictly dominated. There
always exists a best response because the indierence loci between pairs of policies all
intersect in the same point (c
i;
i), in which the regulator is indierent between bailout,
forbearance, and takeover.24
Result 2 of proposition 3 states that risk-contingent policies that imply a bailout are
always possible, and a subset of such policies will achieve ex-ante and ex-post discipline
of the banker's behavior. This can be illustrated by overlapping the aR( , c, , )
and aS( , c, , ) functions. By doing so, the feasible risk-contingent policies can be
determined. This is presented in gure 2 in the (c;) space. The best response function
to the banker making a risky investment in t = 1 has the indierence locus shifted to the
right and upwards compared to the locus associated to the best response when the banker
plays safe. The explanation is that the scal cost of stopping BBFS is higher when the
banker has played risky and higher for bailout compared to takeover or forbearance.25
The two policies fTR;BSg, and fFR;BSg, which include the bailout of the conserva-
tive banker, discipline the banker in t = 1 and t = 2. They discipline the banker in
t = 1 because they provide the conservative banker with subsidies and the risky banker
with punishment. These policies also prevent BBFS because the bad returns are tackled
with bailouts (as the banker always plays safe in the rst investment).26 Figure 2 ex-
emplies condition (2) of proposition 3. It shows that there are always sets f , c, , g
that support strictly dominant fTR;BSg and fFR;BSg policies, for which the banker is
disciplined in t = 1 and t = 2. It is so because the best response function to the risky
23This general result requires the additional assumption

1   
RG + (1   )RB   SB   (A   D) > 0
which implies that it is feasible for the regulator to commit to forbearance (F) when the banker played
the safe investment in t = 1.
24This is explained by the fact that the regulator's payo to playing takeover is a linear combination
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=1). This has two consequences. First, the indi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must also be indierent between takeover and bailout.
25An additional assumption is required, that is to say that (1 2)RB (A D) < (RB SB), which
ensures that a move from playing safe to playing risky in t = 1 increases the scal costs of forbearance
more than in the case of takeover. This rules out the possibility that the banker plays fFR;TSg, a policy
that benets the risky banker relatively to the conservative banker.
26Risk-contingent policies like fBR;BSg and fTR;TSg cannot discipline the banker. Pure
bailout,fBR;BSg, cannot discipline the banker ex-ante because the regulator cannot credibly commit to
give premia to the conservative banker in the capitalization oer. Once the banker accepts the bailout
oer, the regulator can only provide the minimum capitalization that eliminates BBFS. In the case of
pure takeover,fTR;TSg the banker is disciplined ex-ante when the private costs () imposed to the (de-
tected) risky banker are high enough. However, the banker is not disciplined ex-post as he/she will play
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Figure 1. The regulator's best response function for the banker playing
i in t = 1
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Figure 2. The regulator's feasible risk-contingent policies in t = 214 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
The constraints required to obtain the results of propositions 1, 2, and 3 are compatible
with the consistency constraint, which requires that the net value of the bank is positive
after the privatization. This is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When the model is solved for all   2 	 that comply with (1 2)RB  
(A   D) < RB   SB and 
1 RG   (1   )RB   SB   (A   D) > 0, and for costs of
nancial repression c  A   D + SB + SG, then:
(1) The net value of the bank in t = 1 is positive, E1(R2   D) > 0.




In the initial stage the banker must decide whether to bid or not for the bank and,
simultaneously, the regulator must decide whether to invest or not in bank supervision.
The following assumptions are made in order to solve this game:
(i) In the case of bidding, the banker must oer a non-negative price for the bank,
P  0.27
(ii) There is no competition in the privatization process as there is only one bidder
(`the banker') who makes a `take it or leave it' oer.
(iii) The commitment to invest in bank supervision is mandatory only if the bank is
privatized.






R = fP : E0(

j





priv (P,  ,c,,0,g,)) is the regulator's expected payo in t = 0 when
playing `j', and E0(
nopriv)28 is the expected payo in t = 0 when no privatization
takes place.29
With bank privatization and positive costs of nancial repression, risk-contingent poli-
cies that discipline the banker and include bailouts in favor of the conservative banker,
e.g. fTR,BSg, can be part of the equilibrium solution even if the cost g of the investment
in supervision is close to zero. It is so because the cost of nancial repression associated
to the takeover, if suciently high, can make the bailout dominate the takeover as the
best response to any of the banker's investment decisions for any level of .
Proposition 5. If there is a privatization process and the cost of nancial repression is
dierent from zero (c > 0), there exists a set f ;c;;0;g;g that generates equilibria
with privatization, risk-contingent policies that include a bailout in favor of the conser-
vative banker, i.e. fTR,BSg and fFR,BSg. The banker plays safe both in t = 1 and
t = 2. Additionally,
27The possibility of transfers from the regulator to the banker during privatization is ruled out by
constraining the banker's bid price to be non-negative.
28E0(
nopriv) = A   2c   ((A   D)   2c).
29The value of P
j
R( ,c,,0,g,) can be positive or negative.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 15
(1) The price paid for the bank is smaller than the value of the bank in private





the regulator's reservation price when j is the policy played in t = 0.
(2) The set of all possible equilibria with fTR,BSgis divided into a subset that supports
investment in supervision and a subset in which investment in supervision never
takes place.
Proof. See Appendix
The results of proposition 5 are illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the image in the
(c;) space of the regulator's best response functions and how they change for the two
possible values of . The eect of the increase from 0 to  = 1 is to shift to the left and
upwards the indierence locus between bailout and takeover, while leaving unaected the
other indierence loci. The shift is sucient to make (0;0) the origin of the indierence
locus.
By proposition 3 we know that fTR;BSg and fFR;BSg are always feasible, i.e. there
exists a set f ;c;;0;g;g that supports such policies. When f ;c;;0;g;g is part
of the set A in Figure 3, the equilibrium with fTR;BSg is associated to no investment in
bank supervision. In this case the benets of investing in supervision are zero because
the increase in  cannot change any of the regulator's best responses or the banker's
investment choice in t = 1, which is to play safe.
If f ;c;;0;g;g is part of the set C, the investment in bank supervision changes
the best response to the banker playing risky in t = 1: from bailout to takeover. By
investing in supervision the regulator is able to commit to the policy fTR;BSg instead
of fBR;BSg, simultaneously inducing a change in the banker's investment choice in
t = 1: from risky to safe. When this is the case, the regulator has positive benets from
investing in supervision; the investment is made if the cost g is suciently low. 30
These equilibria can occur only if the private valuation of the bank is positive and
larger than the regulator's reservation price. Only in this case can the banker oer a bid
that the regulator is willing to accept:
(5.1) E0(j( ;c;;0;g;)) > max(0;P
j
R( ;c;;0;g;))
When the regulator's reservation price is negative, the above inequality is always true
because the banker's evaluation of the bank is always positive, independently of the type
30To clarify these results it is convenient to compare them with those that would arise under the
alternative hypothesis that there is no liberalization and the cost of nancial repression is zero (c = 0).
In this case investment in supervision would take place when g is suciently low and fTR;TSg would
be the only dominant risk contingent policy, ruling out bailouts from the equilibrium path of the game.
In terms of Figure 3, the sets f ;c;;0;g;g would be represented only as a point on the vertical axis,
e.g. point H, and the indierence loci reduced to a point on the vertical axis (the intersection of the
loci with the vertical axis). Forbearance would be strictly dominated by takeover, and therefore there
would be only three possible dominant risk-contingent policies. When investment in supervision is made,
takeover will be a best response for any of the banker's choices in t = 1 and for  < 0, making fTR;TSg
the dominant policy. Any point on the vertical axis would be below the indierence point (0;0). As a
consequence, investment in supervision takes place when the cost g is so small that the expected benets
outweigh it.16 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
of risk-contingent policy played in equilibrium by the regulator, or the type of investment
chosen by the banker in t = 1 and t = 2 (see proposition 4).
When the reservation price is positive (the cost of nancial repression is suciently
low) it is possible that privatization does not take place as the condition 5.1 might not




)(E0(R2( ;c;0;;;g))   E0(RNP
2 ))   1invg > 0:
The evaluation of the bank by the banker is larger than the regulator's reservation
price only when the expected value of the bank's assets (E0(R2( ;c;;0;;g))) is higher
under private ownership than under public ownership (E0(RNP
2 )). Only in this case can
the banker compensate the regulator and still make a prot by purchasing the bank.
5.2 is always satised when, in the equilibrium of the complete game for set A, the
regulator makes no investment in supervision in t = 0 and the risk-contingent policy
fTR;BSg is played. In fact, fTR;BSg disciplines the banker in t = 1 and t = 2 and
therefore the value of the bank's assets is maximum and 1inv = 0, as no investment in
supervision is made.
In the case of policies fTR;BSg and with investment in bank supervision, set C (see
Figure 3), the feasibility of the equilibrium requires that 5.2 with linv = 1 is fullled.
For the highest levels of g that still allow investment in bank supervision, 5.2 can only
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Figure 3. The regulator's best response functions in t = 2 with 0 and
 = 1
Cooperative equilibria and no investment in bank supervision
When the banker and the regulator are allowed to cooperate, fTR;BSg can be part of the
31The proof of this statement is included in the proof of proposition 5.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 17
equilibrium solution even if in the non-cooperative game, the regulator has an incentive
to invest in supervision and then, as a result, play fTR;TSg. This is the case of set B in
Figure 3. In a non-cooperative scenario, if the cost g is suciently low, the set B leads
to fTR;TSg, investment in supervision, and the minimum price P = max(0;PWI
R )+ paid
for the bank.
In the cooperative scenario, the banker pays a higher price for the bank, P > max(0;PNI
R ),
in exchange for a low-quality bank supervision, i.e. the regulator makes no investment
in supervision in t = 0. As a consequence the regulator plays fTR;BSg (instead of
fTR;TSg), the banker is disciplined in t = 1 and benets from a bailout in case of
bad returns. The banker then bids a higher price for the bank. The condition for this
equilibrium to be possible is:
(5.3) E0(NI)   E0(WI) > PNI
R   PWI
R
where the superscript WI and NI respectively denote whether there is or not an invest-
ment in bank supervision.
In order for the compensation transfer to be possible, the resulting increase in the pri-
vate evaluation of the bank must be larger than the increase in the regulator's reservation




)(E0(R2(:::)WI)   E0(R2(:::)NI)) + g > 0
which means that the cooperative equilibrium is possible when the value of the bank's
assets without investment in supervision is larger than the value of the assets with
investment. This is always true because fTR;BSg disciplines the banker ex-ante and ex-
post, while fTR;TSg cannot avoid the eciency costs of BBFS and nancial repression.
Cooperative equilibria in set C are not viable because in that case the value of the bank's
assets is higher when an investment in supervision is made.
Time inconsistency of ex-ante regulatory solutions
In some circumstances, ex-ante regulatory solutions are not time consistent. So far it
was assumed that the investment in bank supervision aects only the regulator's options
to tackle the bank's insolvency ex-post. It can be shown that if the investment aects
the regulator's ability to detect the banker's actions ex-ante, this does not ensure that
the regulator always invests in supervision.
The introduction of ex-ante regulation requires the following modications of the
model:
(i) The regulator has the option to invest in bank prudential regulation in t = 0 and
be able to observe the banker's action in t = 1 and, therefore, force him/her to
play safe in t = 1.
(ii) The cost of the investment in prudential regulation must be g1 > 0.
(iii) The regulator can detect the net value of the bank in t = 2 with probability  = 1.32
In this context, bailouts are justied only by a positive cost of nancial repression as-
sociated to takeover. The regulator's best response functions to the banker's investment
choices can be depicted then by gure 3, where the indierence locus is that associated
to  = 1.
32Assumption (iii), which means perfect detection by the regulator, simplies the analysis.18 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
The regulator has an incentive to invest in bank prudential regulation in t = 0 only
when the dominant risk-contingent policy in the continuation game (in t = 2) induces
the banker to play risky in t = 1. When f ;c;; = 1;g;g supports policies fTR;BSg
and fFR;BSg, where the banker is disciplined ex-ante, the regulator never invests in
bank prudential regulation. For example, this occurs within sets A and C in Figure
3. Within these sets, investment in prudential regulation is superuous because the
regulator tackles a bad return with bailout, regardless of having previously invested or
not in prudential regulation. This is expressed by the following proposition.33
Proposition 6. For equilibria with pure strategies in the complete game, when f ;c;; =
1;g;g supports risk contingent policies that discipline the banker in t = 1, privatization
takes place without any investment in bank prudential regulation.
Proof. The key assumption for this result is that the investment in bank prudential
regulation is only eective in t = 1, but not in t = 2 after that the bad outcome
materializes and the regulator cannot induce the banker to play safe unless it decides to
bailout or takeover the bank.
Bank deregulation
Most of the model's results hold also for the case in which nancial liberalization takes
the form of deregulation. The main dierence is that, in the case of deregulation, the
banker cannot compensate the regulator for the liberalization by bidding for the bank;
therefore the set f ;c;;0;g;g that supports bank deregulation is a subset of the set
that supports liberalization with privatization.
To allow the model to deal with the deregulation case the following changes must be
made:
(i) The banker owns the bank during all four periods (except when the bank is na-
tionalized). Therefore, in t = 0 the banker's bidding price is zero (P = 0), and the
regulator agrees to deregulate when the reservation price is negative P
j
R < 0. The
reservation price must also take into account that the banker owns the bank.34
(ii) With nancial repression the bank has access only to the safe investment and there
exists a cost c that reduces the investments' average returns. The cost c repre-
sents the negative eects of limiting the banker's access to investment technologies.
33An alternative (when there is no investment in bank prudential regulation) is to allow the regulator
to take the bank over in t = 0. If the regulator infers that the banker plays risky in t = 1 then he/she
has an incentive to take the bank over in t = 0 in order to avoid the banker's moral hazard. Takeover
is rational in t = 0 when the regulator cannot observe the banker's actions and therefore is not able to
control the banker's behavior. If the banker expects that the regulator intervenes in t = 0, he/she may
not bid for the bank and privatization does not take place. The introduction of this feature however does
not modify our results. The risk-contingent policies that support the banker's discipline in t = 1 and
t = 2, such as fTR;BSg or fFR;BSg, where bailouts are played in equilibrium to benet the conservative
banker, by denition do not elicit the takeover by the regulator in t = 0.
34The denition of the reservation price changes to P
j










A   2c   (1   )
2(A   D + 2Sb   2c) if c <
1
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1
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Deregulation, by allowing the banker to have access to all investment technologies,
increases the safe investment's average return (by making c = 0), provides the
bank with access to the risky investment, and creates asymmetries of information
between the banker and the regulator.
(iii) When the regulator takes over the bank it reintroduces nancial repression because
he/she does not have the knowhow to operate with the new technologies.35
With deregulation, the liberalization stage is exclusively determined by the regulator's
decision to deregulate and invest in bank supervision. Deregulation depends entirely on
the regulator because the banker bids zero and always prefers deregulation.
Assumptions (ii) and (iii) guarantee that the results of stages two and three of the
game are the same as in the case of privatization; therefore, also they can be illustrated
by using Figure 3.
The main results of proposition 5 hold also for the case of deregulation, i.e. there is
always a set f ;c;;0;g;g that supports equilibria with deregulation and fTR;BSg as
the regulator's dominant policy in t = 2. Figure 3 shows that the policy fTR;BSg is the
regulator's strictly dominant policy in t = 2 for some f ;c;;0;g;g.
In such cases some of these f ;c;;0;g;g comply with PR( ;c;;0;g;) < 0 mak-
ing fTR;BSg part of the equilibria with deregulation in the complete game. Since bankers
cannot bid for deregulation, the set f ;c;;0;g;g that supports deregulation must be
a subset of the set that supports privatization. This is expressed in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 7. When liberalization takes the form of deregulation under assumptions
(i)-(iii) above, the following holds:
1. There exists a set f ,c,,0,g,g that supports equilibria with deregulation, fTR;BSg,
and the banker playing safe in t = 1 and t = 2.
2. This set is only a subset of the elements that support fTR;BSg with privatization.
Proof. See Appendix.
The absence of transfer mechanisms reduces the set of elements that support liberal-
ization and also rules out the possibility of cooperative equilibria of the kind described
above. This feature of the deregulation process has policy implications. Deregulation
takes place only for cases in which c is suciently high, while privatization admits lower
levels of the cost of nancial repression. It is evident that deregulation is identical to
privatization if the banker is allowed to bid for the deregulation.
It is possible to extend the model to consider a case of `regulatory capture', where the
banker has an incentive to provide direct informal monetary transfers to the regulator
and these transfers do not generate revenues for the public sector. Deregulation through
cronyism may be costly in terms of eciency if  takes on a negative value suciently
large. It would therefore be advantageous to eliminate the phenomenon by introducing
formal mechanisms through which the banker can bid for deregulation.
Assumptions (ii) and (iii) make proposition 6 valid also for the case of deregulation.
The regulator does not invest in ex-ante prudential regulation when the time consistent
35If the regulator could manage eciently the new investment technologies then it would be convenient
for him/her to purchase (nationalize) the bank from the banker and afterwards deregulate.20 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
policy already disciplines the banker in t = 1. By proposition 7 we know that policies
that include bailouts to conservative bankers such as fTR;BSg are feasible, and discipline
bankers in t = 1. By proposition 6 we know that in that case the regulator would never
invest in prudential regulation to control the banker's ex-ante risk taking.
6. conclusions
The present model was developed to explain how governments react to solvency prob-
lems of banks. The model assumes that the banker's risk is veriable, that the regulator
could not pre-commit and that the liberalization process (bank privatization) takes place
before a potential solvency shock.
In the model, the rationale of bailouts is to avoid the costs of nancial repression
associated to the takeover of the bank. Under certain assumptions, equilibria with
bailouts are always feasible. This result diers from the result that is obtained when the
privatization process is not part of the game and the cost of nancial repression is zero.
In this latter case, equilibria always includes takeover and bailouts are unfeasible if the
costs of investment in bank supervision are suciently low.
In some circumstances, the regulator can commit to policies that punish the risky
banker with takeover and benet the conservative banker with bailout. This policy
disciplines the banker ex-ante and ex-post and the value of the bank's assets takes its
maximum value.
From this result several implications follow. First, there is a set of cooperative equi-
libria where the regulator nds convenient not to invest in bank supervision in exchange
for a higher bidding price for the bank. Second, the regulator does not introduce pru-
dential regulation ex-ante if the time consistent policies to tackle bad returns ex-post
also discipline the banker ex-ante. This result depends on the regulator's inability to
pre-commit and the fact that prudential regulation can aect only the banker's rst
investment, while it has no eect on the banker's second investment.
Finally, the main results of the model also apply to a case in which liberalization
takes the form of deregulation. There are, however, some dierences between the two
cases of liberalization. With deregulation, liberalization is less likely to occur because
the banker cannot compensate the regulator for the liberalization. Deregulation takes
places only when the cost of nancial repression is so high that a monetary compensation
is unnecessary. In the absence of a formal channel to bid for liberalization, there can be
informal mechanisms of bidding, such as the case of `regulatory capture'.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 21
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Appendix A
A.1. Proof of proposition 1. First, assume that the banker played risky in t = 1 and
realized a bad return. If the banker plays risky again in t = 2 the expected pay-o is
E2(RR
F  P) = (Max(0;A+RB +RG  D) P)+(1 )(Max(0;A+2RB  D) P)
If the banker plays safe in t = 2, the expected pay-o is
E2(RS
F  P) = (Max(0;A+RB+SG D) P)+(1 )(Max(0;A+RB+SB D) P)
Since it is Max(0;A + 2RB   D) = 0 and Max(0;A + RB + SB   D) = 0, the banker
will always play risky because
E2(RR
F   P)   E2(RS
F   P) = RG   SG > 0
Second, assume that the banker played risky in t = 1 and realized a good return. If the
banker plays risky again in t = 2 his expected payo is
E2(RR
F  P) = (max(0;A+2RG  D) P)+(1 )(max(0;A+RG +RB  D) P)
If he plays safe in t = 2 his expected payo is
E2(RS
F  P) = (max(0;A+RG+SG D) P)+(1 )(max(0;A+RG+SB D) P)
Since it is Max(0;A + RG + RB   D) = A + RG + RB   D and Max(0;A + RG +
SB   D) = A + RG + SB   D, the banker will always play safe in t = 2 because
E2(RR
F   P)   E2(RS
F   P) = RG + (1   )RB < 0.
Second, assume that the banker played safe in t = 1, the same result applies. After a
bad result the banker always plays risky because
E2(SR
F   P)   E2(SS
F   P) = RG   SG > 0
and after a good result he/she always plays safe in t = 2 because
E2(SR
F   P)   E2(SS
F   P) = RG + (1   )RB < 0:
A.2. Proof of proposition 2. Assume that the set fRG;RB;SG;SB;A;Dg fullls con-
ditions (1) and (2) of proposition 1.
A.2.1. Case 1 of proposition 2 (takeover). The proof is two parts: (i) it is shown that
if the regulator takes the bank over, in t = 2 a safe investment is always made; (ii) it
is shown that when the regulator chooses to take the bank over, the banker hides bad
returns and, therefore, BBFS can be stopped only with probability , i.e. the probability
to detect the bank's true net value.
i. Assume that the regulator detected a bad return to the risky investment in t = 1




T ) = (A + RB + RG   c) + (1   )(A + 2RB   c)
+[ ((A + RB + RG   c   D) + (1   )(A + 2RB   c   D))] + (g   P)
If the regulator plays safe in t = 2, the expected payo is
E2(
RS
T ) = (A + RB + SG   c) + (1   )(A + RB + SB   c) +
+[ ((A + RB + SG   c   D) + (1   )(A + RB + SB   c   D))] + (g   P)FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 23
The regulator will always play safe because
E2(
RS
T )   E2(
RR
T ) = (   1)(RG + (1   )RB) > 0
Now assume that the regulator has detected a bad return to the safe investment and
has taken the bank over. If the regulator plays risky in t = 2, the expected payo is
E2(
SR
T ) = (A + SB + RG   c) + (1   )(A + SB + RB   c)
+[Max(0;D   (A + SB + RG   c))
+(1   )Max(0;D   (A + SB + RB   c   D))] + (g   P)
If the regulator plays safe in t = 2, the expected payo is
E2(
SS
T ) = (A + SB + SG   c) + (1   )(A + 2SB   c)
+[Max(0;D   (A + SB + SG   c))
+(1   )Max(0;D   (A + 2SB   c   D))] + (g   P)
Notice that, from equation 2.1, Max(0;D   (A + SB + RB   c   D)) = 0 and
Max(0;D   (A + SB + SG   c)) = 0.
These payos dier from those associated to the previous case when the banker
plays risky in t = 1. The payos dier because the regulator nationalizes the bank
when the banker played risky in t = 1 and assumes only the management of the
bank when the banker plays safe in t = 1. However, also in this case, the regulator
prefers to play safe because
E2(
SS
T )   E2(
SR
T ) =  (RG + (1   )RB) + (1   )(RB   SB) > 0
ii. Assume that the banker played risky in t = 1 and realized a bad return. The
regulator chooses to take the bank over. If the banker reveals the true net value of
the bank, the expected pay-o is
E2(R
T;reveal   P) =  ( + P)
If the banker hides the true net value of the bank, the expected pay-o is
E2(R
T;hide   P) =   + (1   )(A + RB + RG   D)   P
The banker will always hide the true net value because
E2(R
T;hide   P)   E2(R
T;reveal   P) = (1   ) + (1   )(A + RB + RG   D) > 0
Assume now that the banker played safe in t = 1 and realized a bad return. If the
banker reveals the true net value, the expected pay-o is
E2(S
T;reveal   P) = (A + SB + SG   c   D)   P
If the banker hides the true net value, the expected pay-o is
E2(S
T;hide   P) = ((A + SB + SG   c   D)   P) + (1   )((A + SB + RG   D)   P)
The banker will always hide the true net value because
E2(S
T;hide   P)   E2(S
T;reveal   P) = (1   )(RG   SG + c) > 024 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
A.2.2. Case 2 of proposition 2 (bailout). The proof is in two parts: (i) it is shown
that if the banker accepts the bailout oer, he/she will play safe in t = 2 only if the
capitalization is larger than the threshold indicated in the proposition; (ii) it is shown
that the bailout oer is always accepted by the banker.
i. Assume that the banker played the risky investment in t = 1; a bad return is
revealed; the bailout oer is accepted and the true net value of the bank is revealed.
If the banker plays risky again in t = 2, the expected pay-o is
E2(RR
B   P) = (Max(0;A + RB + RG + AR   D)   P) +
+(1   )(Max(0;A + 2RB + AR   D)   P)
Conditions 1 and 2 of proposition 1 and equation 2.6 ensure that Max(0;A+2RB  
D+AR) = 0 and Max(0;A+RB +RG +AR  D) = A+RB +RG +AR  D,
therefore, if the banker plays safe in t = 2, the expected pay-o is
E2(RS
B   P) = (Max(0;A + RB + SG + AR   D)   P) +
+(1   )(Max(0;A + RB + SB + AR   D)   P)
From condition 2 of proposition 1, it is
Max(0;A + RB + SG + AR   D) = A + RB + SG + AR   D
If AR >  (A + RB + SB   D), the banker plays safe only if
E2(RS
B   P)   E2(RR
B   P) = (A + RB + AR   D   P) +
 ((A + RB + RG + AR   D)   P)  0
which can be simplied to
E2(RS
B   P)   E2(RR
B   P) = (1   )(AR   ( RB +

1   
RG   (A   D))))
Thus, the banker plays safe only if
AR   RB +

1   
RG   (A   D))
In this case it is always true that AR >  (A + RB + SB   D).
Assume now that the banker made a safe investment in t = 1, and realized a bad
return. Applying the same methodology we know that the banker plays safe in t = 2
when
E2(SS
B   P)   E2(SR
B   P) = (1   )(AS   ( SB +

1   
RG   (A   D)))  0
Thus, the banker plays safe only if
AS   SB +

1   
RG   (A   D):
ii. The banker always accepts a bailout oer and reveals the bank's net value because
the capitalization is non-negative. If the capitalization were zero, the banker would
be indierent between accepting and rejecting the bailout, as a bailout with zero
capitalizations is equivalent to forbearance.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 25
A.3. Proof of proposition 3. The proof is in two parts. First it is shown that the reg-
ulator plays a strictly dominant policy faR( ;c;;), aS( ;c;;)g. The second part
shows that there exists a set f ;c;;g for which the strictly dominant risk-contingent
policy implies a bailout in the equilibrium path of the game, and simultaneously disci-
plines the banker in t = 1 and t = 2.








T), are the expected payos of playing F,B, or T
as a response to the banker playing i in t = 1 (i = R;S).






T) are dened as:
E2(
R
F) = A + (2   )Ce + (1   )2(D   A   2RB) + (g   P)
E2(
R
B) = A + Ce + (1   )( RB +

1   
RG   (A   D)) + (g   P)
E2(
R
T) = A + Ce + (1   )((1   )Ce   c) + (1   )(D   A   RB + c)







T) are dened as:
E2(
S
F) = A + (1   )Ce + (1   )2(D   A   SB   RB) + (g   P)
E2(
S
B) = A + Ce + (1   )( SB +

1   
RG   (A   D)) + (g   P)
E2(
S
T) = A + (1   )((1   )Ce   c) + (1   )2(D   A   SB  
(SB   c)   (1   )RB) + (g   P)



















where i is the type of investment played by the banker in t = 1.
Solving the  functions renders for i = R,
R
FB = Ce   (X + B)
R
FT = Ce + c   (B + c)
R
BT = (X + B(1   )   c)   (1   )Ce + c
and for i = S,
S
FB = Ce   (D + B0)
S
FT = Ce + c   (1   )(E + c)
S




B = (1   2)RB   (A   D)
E = (RB   SB)
B0 = (1   )RB   SB   (A   D)26 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
Ce = RG + (1   )RB
d. From proposition 1 and equation 2.6 we have X > 0, B < 0, E < 0, X+B > 0,
B < Ce, and E < Ce.
e. Additionally, we assume that B < E and X + B0 > 0.
f. Dene f ;;ci;
ig as the elements that make the regulator indierent be-















T) when  = 









X + B   Ce







T) when  = 








X + B0   (1   )E
X + B0   (1   )Ce
We know that 
R > 
S.
(2) Denition of best response function when the banker plays risky in t = 1
Forbearance is a best response when R
FB > 0 and R
FT > 0, which boils down
to:
If 0 < c < c
R, forbearance is never a best response.
If c
R < c <  B, forbearance is a best response when 
R >  > Ce+c
B+c .
If  B < c, forbearance is a best response when  < 
R.
Bailout is a best response when R
FB < 0 and R
BT > 0, which boils down to:
If 0 < c < c




R < c, bailout is a best response when  > 
R
Takeover is a best response when i
FT < 0 and i
BT < 0, which boils down to:
When 0 < c < c




R < c <  B, takeover is a best response when  < Ce+c
B+c
When  B < c then takeover is never a best response.FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 27
Putting everything together the best response function can be dened as:
aR( ;c;;) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :



























(3) Denition of the best response function to the banker playing safe in t = 1
With the same methodology used for the previous case, the best response function
can be dened as:
aS( ;c;;) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :



























A.3.2. Proof of part 2 of proposition 3. First it will be shown that risk contingent policies
fTR;BSg and fFR;BSg discipline the banker in t = 1 and t = 2, and that in the event
of a bad return bailout will be played in the equilibrium path of the game. Second, it
will be shown that the there exists a set f , c, ,g that supports fTR;BSg or fFR;BSg
as the regulator's strictly dominant risk contingent policy.
i. Let us assume that the regulator's strictly dominant policy is fFR;BSg. If the
banker plays safe in t = 1 then its expected payo will be E1(S
fFR;BSg   P) =
[(A + 2SG   D) + (1   )(A + SG + SB   D)] + (1   )[(max(0;A + SB + SG +
AS  D))+(1 )(max(0;A+2SB +AS  D))] P = A D+(1 )AS  P.
When the banker plays risky in t = 1 its expected return is E1(R
fFR;BSg   P) =
[(A+RG+SG D)+(1 )(A+RG+SB D)]+(1 )[max(0;A+RB+RG D)+
(1 )max(0;A+2RB  D)] P = (A+RG D)+(1 )(A+RB +RG D) P.
Then E1(S
fFR;BSg   P)   E1(R
fFR;BSg   P) =  SB   (A   D + RB + RG) > 0 for
all   2 	.
Now lets assume that the regulator's strictly dominant policy is fTR;BSg. It will
always be true that E1(S
fTR;BSg   P) > E1(R
fTR;BSg   P) because it is true that
E1(S
fTR;BSg P) = E1(S
fFR;BSg P). This is sucient to prove that the banker will
always play safe, as it was shown above that E1(S
fFR;BSg  P) > E1(R
fFR;BSg  P),
and it is straightforward that E1(R
fTR;BSg   P) < E1(R
fFR;BSg   P). As both
fTR;BSg and fFR;BSg discipline the banker in t = 1 to play safe, and both have
bailout as a best response to a bad return of the safe investment, it is true that the28 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
regulator will always play bailout in the equilibrium path of the game when a bad
return occurs.
ii. There exists a set f , c, ,g that supports fTR;BSg. The proof for fFR;BSg is
analogous. The conditions for fTR;BSg to be strictly dominant are:
(1) When 0 < c < c




R < c <  B :  < Ce+c
B+c
(3) When 0 < c < c




S < c :  > 
S
Conditions (1) and (2) are the conditions for takeover to be the best response to the
banker's risky investment in t = 1, and conditions (3) and (4) are the conditions for
bailout to be the best response to the banker's safe investment in t = 1. Thus, it




S, conditions (1)-(4) can be reduced to the three conditions presented
below:
(1') For 0 < c < c
S :
(1 )Ce c




S < c < c
R :
(1 )Ce c
X+B(1 ) c >  > 
S
(3') For c
R < c : Ce+c
B+c >  > 
S.
It will be sucient here to show that there always exists a  to comply with (10)
(although there is always a  that complies with (2') and (3'), but the proof will









X+B0 (1 )(E+c). If the last
inequality is solved for c then it renders  [B
 +E(1+
 
 )] > c. We know that
if 0 < c < c
S then it will always be true that  [B
 + E(1 +
 
 )] > c. The left
side of the last inequality cannot be lower than  
1+
 E, which is the case if we
substitute E for B, that is  [B
 +E(1+
 
 )] <  [E
 +E(1+
 
 )] =  
1+
 E.
On the other hand the value of c must be lower than c
S. It is easy to show that
 
1+
 E > c
S because by denition c
S <  E (see the best response function to
the banker playing safe in t = 1).
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4.
1. Proof of result 1
It is sucient to calculate the net value of the bank when the banker is expected to
play risky in t = 1 and the regulator takeover in t = 2, with the maximum possible
level of costs of nancial repression c = A+SB +SG  D. If the net value is positive
it will also be positive for any other action by the banker and policy choice by the
regulator.
The bank's net value in t = 0 right after liberalization is:
Erisky
0;fTR;TSg(R2   D) = A + Ce + (1   )( c + (1   )Ce)   DFINANCIAL SAFETY NETS, BAILOUTS AND MORAL HAZARD 29
Because Ce >  (A+SB +SG  D), then it is sucient to show that the net value is
positive for  = 1:
Erisky
0;fTR;TSg(R2( = 1)   D) = A + Ce   (1   )c   D > 0
Which can be simplied to:
RG + (1   )RB + (A   D) + (2   1)SG > 0:
To prove that this term is always positive, it must be showed that if RB, SG and RG
are substituted by their lowest possible values then the term is still positive. What
are the lowest possible values of RB, SG, and RG? When we solve the model for the
set of all   2 	 that comply with B < E and X +B0 > 0, then the set (RG, RB, SG,
SB, , A, D) is constrained to the following:
(1)  ((A   D) + 2RB) <  SB < 
1 RG
(2)  (1   )(A   D + 2RB) < RG < 1 
 (A   D)
(3)  (1   )(A   D + 2RB) < SG < RG
(4) (A   D) <  RB < (A   D)(1+
2 )
(5) 2 +    1 > 0.
When
RG !  (1   )(A   D + 2RB)
SG !  (1   )(A   D + 2RB)
RB !  (A   D)(1+
2 )
Then E0(R2   D) ! (A   D)( 3+8 32
2 ) a term that will always be positive for 
which comply with  2 (1
2;1) and 2 +    1 > 0. When
RG !  (1   )(A   D + 2RB)
SG !  (1   )(A   D + 2RB)
RB !  (A   D)
Then E0(R2   D) ! (A   D)( 2+6 32
2 ) a term that will always be positive for 
which comply with  2 (1
2;1) and 2 +    1 > 0.
2. Proof of result 2 If E0(R2   D) > 0 and there is a probability zero that the bank is
nationalized (where the banker suers  private costs) then it will always be true that
E0() > 0 because the banker benets from limited liability in the bank's capital.
When there is a positive probability of bank nationalization, the banker plays risky
in t = 1 an the regulator's best response is takeover, then it must be true that
E1(R
fTR;TSg) > E1(S
fTR;TSg), and we know that E1(S
fTR;TSg) = (A+SG D)+(1 
)(A + SB   D + (SG   c) + (1   )RG) is always positive. Therefore, when risky
is played, E1(R
fTR;TSg) must be positive too, guaranteed by low enough private cost
, such that:
 <  
(SG   RG) + (1   )(1   )(SB   RB)
(1   )
  (A + SB + SG   c   D)
A.5. Proof to proposition 5. It is proven that with bank privatization and c > 0,
there exists a set f ;c;;gamma0;g;g that supports fTR;BSg, and the banker play-
ing safe both in t = 1 and t = 2, in the complete game. It is also shown that only30 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
a subset of these equilibria implies investment in supervision. In any case, the banker
will always bid the price P = max(0;P
j
R)+. The case of fFR;BSg will not be proven here.
Case 1. Equilibrium with fTR;BSg and no investment in bank supervision. In this case
fTR;BSg is the regulator's strictly dominant policy for both 0 and  = 1.
Step 1. there exists a set ( , c, , 0, ) that complies with:
(1) R
FT(;c) = Ce + c   (B + c) < 0
(2) R
BT(0;c) = (X + B(1   0)   0c)   (1   0)Ce + 0c < 0
(3) R
BT( = 1;c) = (X   c) + c < 0
(4) S
FB(;c) = Ce   (X + B0) < 0
(5) S
BT( = 1;c) = (X + B0   (1   )(E + c)) + c > 0
(6) S
BT(0;c) = (X + B0   (1   )0(E + c)) + 0c   (1   0)Ce > 0
Inequalities (1), (2), and (3) dene the conditions for takeover to be the best
response to the banker playing risky in t = 1 with 0 and  = 1. Inequalities
(4), (5), and (6) are de conditions for bailout to be the best response to bankers
playing safe in t = 1 with both 0 and  = 1. Let us assume that c
S < c
R.
These inequalities lead to the following conditions:
(1') If 0 < c < c
S: then
(1 0)Ce 0c
X+B(1 0) 0c >  >   c
X+B0 (1 )(E+c)
(2') If c
S < c < c
R: then
(1 0)Ce 0c
X+B(1 0) 0c >  > 
S
(3') If c
R < c <  B: then Ce+c
B+c >  > 
S
It is sucient here to prove that a  exists to comply with condition (1')
(even though there also exists  to comply with conditions (2') and (3')).
If the inequality
(1 0)Ce 0c
X+B(1 0) 0c >   c
X+B0 (1 )(E+c) is solved for c it ren-
ders c >  Ce
(1 0)(X+B0 (1 )E)
(1 0)(X+B0 (1 )E) (B0+(1 0)Ce (1 2)E). This last inequal-




S. For the assumption c
S >
c
R, the proof is analogous.
Step 2. The regulator will play fTR;BSg for both 0 and  = 1 and the banker
plays safe in t = 1. In case of a bad return the regulator plays bailout with a cap-
italization oer AS =  SB + 
1 RG  (A D), both when 0 and  = 1. It is
therefore obvious that E0(
(P; ;c;; = 1;g = 0;)) E0(
(P; ;c;;0;g =
0;)) = 0, and E0(
(P; ;c;; = 1;g = 0;)) E0(
(P; ;c;;0;g = 0;)) <
 g. This means that investing in supervision reduces the expected value of
the regulator's payo.
Step 3. When the benets of investing in bank supervision are lower than
the costs, E0(
(P; ;c;; = 1;g = 0;))   E0(
(P; ;c;;0;g = 0;)) <
 g, the reservation price associated to the regulator playing investment is
higher to the one associated to not playing investment: PR( ;c;; = 1;g;) >
PR( ;c;;0;g = 0;), and viceversa. The proof of this statement is presented
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By denition, reservation prices are those that make equal the regulator's payo
with and without privatization. Formally:
(1) E0(
(P;g; = 1;:::)) = E0(
no priv)
(2) E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::)) = E0(
no priv)
The reservation price is the P that guarantees the above equalities: PWI
R stands
for the P that guarantees the equality when investment is played, and PNI
R
stands for the price P that guarantees the second equality, when no investment
is played. We can write the left side of the equalities in the following way:
(1') E0(
(P;g; = 1;:::) = E0(
(P = 0;g = 0; = 1;:::)) + (g   P)
(2') E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::) = E0(
(P = 0;g = 0;0;:::)) + ( P)
By introducing (10) and (20) into (1) and (2) respectively, and then solving




(P = 0;g = 0; = 1;:::))   E0(




(P = 0;g = 0;0;:::))   E0(
no priv)]
Then, the dierence PNI
R   PWI





(P = 0;g = 0;0;:::))   E0(




R < 0, then it must be true that:
E0(
(P = 0;g = 0; = 1;:::))   E0(
(P = 0;g = 0;0;:::)) <  g.
Additionally we know that
E0(
(P = 0;g = 0; = 1;:::)) E0(
(P = 0;g = 0;0;:::)) = E0(
(P;g =
0; = 1;:::))   E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::)),
therefore the dierence PNI
R   PWI
R < 0 implies that:
E0(
(P;g = 0; = 1;:::))   E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::)) <  g.
This is the condition that guarantees that the investment in bank supervi-
sion reduces the regulator's expected payo.
Step 4. Here it is proven that if fTR;BSg is strictly dominant for 0 and  = 1,
then in the rst stage of the game the Nash equilibrium will consist in fNo
investment, P = max(0;PNI
R )+g, and privatization will take place.
The banker's objective is to maximize E(j) P, where j represents the policy
of investment or no investment in bank supervision in t = 0. If the banker
decides not to bid or bids P < P
j
R then there is no privatization in equilibrium
and the banker's payo is 0. If the banker's bid P > P
j
R then privatization takes
place and the banker's benets are E(j) P. So when E(j) < P
j
R, the banker
will not bid and his payo will be 0, and when E(j) > P
j
R, with the objective
of maximizing his payo, the banker will bid the minimum price that induces
the regulator to accept and privatize the bank P = max(0;P
j
R)+.
The regulator's objective is to maximize E0(
(:::)), which is equivalent to max-
imize the dierence between the bid and the reservation price P   PR. When
the banker doesn't bid or bids a price inferior to both reservation prices, then
the privatization doesn't take place and the regulator's extraction is 0. For any
given bidding price P,that is superior to at least one of the reservation prices,
the regulator will chose to invest or not invest in bank supervision in order to
minimize the reservation price PR and maximize the extraction P  PR. By step32 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
2 we know that E0(
(P;g = 0; = 1;:::))   E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::)) <  g,
and therefore, by step 3, PNI
R < PWI
R . Therefore, the option of no investment
weakly dominates that of investment in bank supervision. When this is the
case fNo investment, P = max(0;PNI
R )+ g is the only possible equilibrium in
t = 0. The regulator never deviates because playing investment would mean an
inferior extraction, and possibly negative, in which case privatization would not
take place. The banker never deviates because P = max(0;PNI
R )+ maximizes
E(NI)   P. The pair f Investment, P = max(0;PWI
R )+ g is never a Nash
equilibrium of the stage game because the regulator benets from deviating to
"no investment" as that increases the extraction P   PR because PNI
R < PWI
R .
Step 5. The equilibrium fNo investment, P = max(0;PNI
R )+ g requires that
the evaluation of the bank by the private banker is larger than the minimum
bid the regulator would accept for the bank:
E0(NI)   max(0;PNI
R )+ > 0
. This term can be simplied to (1 1
)(E0R2( ;c;g = 0;;0;) E0R2;no priv) >
0. When fTR;BSg is part of the equilibrium, the banker is disciplined in t = 1
and t = 2 and therefore the economic value of the bank's assets is the maximum.
Formally,
E0(NI)   max(0;PNI




and therefore privatization always takes place.
Case 2. Equilibrium with fTR;BSg and investment in bank supervision. In this case
fTR;BSg is the regulator's strictly dominant policy for both  = 1 and fBR;BSg
is strictly dominant for 0.
Step 1. It must be proven that it is feasible for fTR;BSg to be strictly
dominant for  = 1 and fBR;BSg for 0 in t = 2. For this to be true the set
( ,c, , 0, g, ) that respects the following inequalities must be dierent from
an empty set ; :
(1) R
FB(;c) = Ce   (X + B)0 < 0
(2) R
FT(;c) = Ce + c   (B + c) < 0
(3) R
BT(0;c) = (X + B(1   0)   0c)   (1   0)Ce + 0c > 0
(4) R
BT( = 1;c) = (X   c) + c < 0
(5) S
FB(;c) = Ce   (X + B0) < 0
(6) S
BT( = 1;c) = (X + B0   (1   )(E + c)) + c > 0
(7) S
BT(0;c) = (X + B0   (1   )0(E + c)) + 0c   (1   0)Ce > 0
Conditions (1)-(4) are required to secure that bailout is the best response with
0 to the banker playing risky in t = 1, and takeover is the best response with
 = 1 to the banker playing risky in t = 1. Conditions (5)-(7) are required to
guarantee that bailout is always the best response to the banker playing safe for
 = 1 and 0. These seven conditions can be summarized in the following two:
Bailout is dominant for  = 1 and 0 as a response to the banker playing safe
in t = 1 when:
(a) If 0 < c < c
S: then  >   c
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(b) If c
S < c: then  > 
S
Bailout is dominant for 0 and takeover is dominant for  = 1 as a response to
the banker playing risky in t = 1 when:
(1') If 0 < c < c
R: then   c
X c >  >
(1 0)Ce 0c
X+B(1 0) 0c
Let us assume that c
S < c






X + B0   (1   )(E + c)
to prove that the existence of a  that complies with above inequalities.
By solving for c it renders c <  
B0 (1 )E
 . The right side of the inequality
is positive and therefore the inequality will be true for at least a subset of the
interval 0 < c < c
S.
Step 2. The regulator will play fTR;BSg for  = 1 and the banker plays
safe in t = 1. In case of a bad return the regulator plays bailout with a cap-
italization oer AS =  SB + 
1 RG   (A   D), when  = 1. The reg-
ulator will play fBR;BSg for 0 and the banker plays risky in t = 1. In
case of a bad return the regulator plays bailout with a capitalization oer
AR =  RB + 














fBR;BSg) >  g when  g is suciently low, in which
case investment in bank supervision increases the expected value of the regula-
tor's payo.
Step 3. When the benets of investing in bank supervision are higher than the
costs, E0(
(P; ;c;; = 1;g = 0;))   E0(
(P; ;c;;0;g = 0;)) >  g,
the reservation price associated to the regulator playing investment is lower
than the one associated to not playing investment: PR( ;c;; = 1;g;) <
PR( ;c;;0;g = 0;), and viceversa (see the proof above for the previous case).
Step 4. Here it will be proven that for the set ( ,c,, 0, g,) that supports
fTR;BSg as strictly dominant for  = 1, and fBR;BSg for 0, then for a subset
it will be true that in the rst stage of the game the Nash equilibrium will con-
sist in fInvestment, P = max(0;PWI
R )+g, and privatization will take place.
When E(j) < P
j
R, the banker will not bid and his payo will be 0, and when
E(j) > P
j
R, with the objective of maximizing his payo, the banker will bid




By step 2 we know that E0(
(P;g = 0; = 1;:::))   E0(
(P;g = 0;0;:::)) >
 g, and therefore, by step 3, PNI
R > PWI
R . Therefore, the option of invest-
ment weakly dominates that of no investment in bank supervision. When this is
the case f investment, P = max(0;PWI
R )+ g is the only possible equilibrium in
t = 0. The regulator never deviates because playing no investment would mean
an inferior extraction P  PR, and possibly negative, in which case privatization34 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
would not take place. The banker never deviates because P = max(0;PWI
R )+
maximizes E(WI) P. The pair f No investment, P = max(0;PNI
R )+ g is never
a Nash equilibrium of the stage game because the regulator benets from deviat-
ing to "investment" as that increases the extraction P PR because PNI
R > PWI
R .
Step 5. The equilibrium finvestment, P = max(0;PWI
R )+ g requires the
compliance with two additional constraints:
(1) (1   1








Condition (1) represents the constraint that the banker's private valuation of the
bank must be superior to the minimum bid the regulator is willing to accept, and
condition (2) represents the condition for investment in supervision to improve
the regulator's expected payo. These conditions can be simplied respectively
to:
(1') (1   1
)2c   g > 0
(2')  Ce + (1   )E >  g
When g approaches zero then the equilibrium is always possible. When g is just
enough to encourage investment in bank supervision, g ! Ce
   (1   )E, the






The proof of the feasibility of privatization requires the proof that the inter-
section between set C (see gure 3 of main text) and the above condition is
non-empty. Set C represents the set where fTR;BSg is dominant with  = 1,
and fBR;BSg with 0. First, it must be noted that for any f ;g, set C is
bounded by (c
R;
R). Taking this into consideration it is clear that to prove













for  > 
R. The term 
 1X represents the indierence locus (given ( ,, 0, g,
)) between takeover and bailout as a response to the banker playing risky in
t = 1 with perfect detection ( = 1). Solving this inequality we have,
 <
Ce
2X + (1   )E
:
The intersection is non-empty because Ce
2X+(1 )E > 
R.
A.6. Proof to proposition 7.
A.6.1. Equilibria with deregulation, fTR;BSg, and no investment in bank supervision.
By step 1, result 1 of proposition 5 we know that there exists a set of elements ( ,c, ,
0, g, ) for which the policy fTR;BSg is strictly dominant for 0 and  = 1, i.e. set
A in gure 3 of the main text. On the other hand, the set of elements that supports
deregulation is determined by a negative reservation price PR( ; c, , 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can be presented as a constraint on c: c > f( ; c, , 0, g, ), equivalent to,
(1   )
(1   )2   1
(
X + B0   (1   )E
2
) < c;
where the left hand side of the inequality is always inferior to 1
2(A D+SB +SG). This
means that for c > 1
2(A   D + SB + SG) deregulation always takes place. For all the
set ( ,c, , 0, g, ) that support fTR;BSg as strictly dominant for 0 and  = 1, the
constraint c > f( ;, , 0, g, ) is satised. This is true because,
(1   )
(1   )2   1
(




(1   )   1
(X + B0   (1   )E)
where for a given set f ;;0;g;g the left hand side represents the minimum value
of c that makes deregulation convenient for the regulator, and the right hand side is
the minimum c that guarantees that bailout (and not takeover) is the regulator's best
response to the banker playing safe in t = 1 with perfect detection ( = 1). Solving the
inequality we have 1 +    (1   )2 > 0, which is always true.
A.6.2. Equilibria with deregulation, fTR;BSg, and investment in bank supervision. It
must be shown that for the set ( ,c, , 0, g, ) that supports fTR;BSg as strictly
dominant for  = 1 and fBR;BSg for 0, in other words set C of gure 3 in the main
text, if there is deregulation, it will only be a subset of the ( ; c, , 0, g, ) that support
privatization.
First, it must be noted that for any f ;0;g;g, set C is bounded in the (c;) space
by (c
R;
R). If c < 1
2(A   D + SB + SG), and assuming the highest value of g that still
provides the regulator with the incentive to invest in bank supervision, g ! Ce
  (1 )E,
deregulation takes place when,
(1   )
(1   )2   1
(












For the proof it is sucient to show that for c < 1
2(A D+SB +SG) the intersection
of set C of gure 3 of the main text and the set of elements supporting deregulation is
non empty. Formally, the compliance with the following inequality is required:
(1   )
(1   )2   1
(















where the right hand side of the inequality consists in the maximum value of c (given
( ,, 0, g, )) for which the regulator prefers takeover over bailout as a response to the
banker playing risky in t = 1 with perfect detection ( = 1).
The compliance with the above inequality is not guaranteed. However, for our pur-
poses it is sucient to show that the above constraint is tighter compared to the one

















2 ) is posi-
tive and because 
 1 < 
(1 )2 1. In proposition 5 case 2 it was shown that privatization36 J. HURTUBIA TORRES AND C. SARDONI
takes place in a subset of C. In the present case deregulation may take place or not, but
if it does it must be a subset of the case with privatization as the constraint associated
to deregulation is tighter.